Indonesia Law Review
Volume 3

Number 2

Article 3

8-31-2013

THE SINKING OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS?
MITIGATING THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE TO MARITIME
JURISDICTION AND A PROPOSAL FOR SOLUTIONS
I Made Andi Arsana
Universitas Gadjah Mada

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ilrev
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Arsana, I Made Andi (2013) "THE SINKING OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS? MITIGATING THE
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE TO MARITIME JURISDICTION AND A PROPOSAL FOR SOLUTIONS,"
Indonesia Law Review: Vol. 3 : No. 2 , Article 3.
DOI: /10.15742/ilrev.v3n2.33
Available at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ilrev/vol3/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Law at UI Scholars Hub. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Indonesia Law Review by an authorized editor of UI Scholars Hub.

The Sinking of Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights?
Mitigating the Impacts of Climate Change to
Maritime Jurisdiction and a Proposal for Solutions
I Made Andi Arsana1
Abstract
While some still debate whether or not climate change is a reality, one
of its impacts, sea level rise, is factual. The cause and the rate of sea level
rise might have been inconclusive but its impacts have been clearly felt.
Sea level rise can also change the legal status of insular features (small
islands/rocks and low tide elevation) that will also affect their capacity
in making maritime claim. For an archipelagic State like Indonesia, small
outer islands/rocks or low-tide elevation are important for location of
basepoints forming the entire system of archipelagic baselines. This
paper investigates the impact of sea level rise to the change of baselines
and maritime limits a coastal state may claim. On the other hand, there
is a need to have fixed maritime limits for better management and to
balance rights and duties of coastal to the ocean. This paper provides
options on how Indonesia as a coastal and archipelagic State can fix
their baselines and or maritime limits in the face of coastal instability
due to sea level rise as a consequence of climate change.
Keywords: baselines, climate change, sovereignty, jurisdiction,
maritime limits, archipelagic state

I. Introduction

In early 2007, Indonesia’s then Minister of Environment, Rachmat
Witoelar, stated that around 2,000 islands of Indonesia were about to sink
in 2030.2 Approaching the United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC) di Bali, he made a similar statement was even though
without stating any specific number.3 Even though the statement was not adequately supported by primary data, Witoelar’s statement certainly sparked
debate in media up until mid 2008. Other parties such as Ministry of Marine
Affairs and Fisheries, Agency for Meteorology and Geophysics also intensively
discussed the issue of sinking islands following Witoelar’s statement.
Climate change, like it or not, has become a highly debated issue in the
1
Lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Universitas Gadjah Mada. The author can be
contacted at madeandi@ugm.ac.id.
2
ABS News, 2007. Indonesia May Lose 2,000 Islands to Warming: Minister Says Climate Change
Could Lead To Rising Sea Levels, Accessed from < http://www.nbcnews.com/id/16867998/ns/world_
news-world_environment/#.UhiUEj8vnDY>, on 15 August 2013.
3
Reuters 2007. Climate change may wipe some Indonesian islands off map, Accessed from
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/12/03/environment-climate-indonesia-islands-dc-idUSJAK15507820071204> on 10 March 2011
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last decade or two with its critical impacts to the nature and the life of human
being. One of the impacts is sea level rise, which brings particular challenges
to coastal state in the world. The sea level rise can theoretically cause the submergence of low-land area, which eventually is harmful to habitat and human
population living in the area. One of the impacts is the increase of vulnerability
of coastal area due to storm surges resulting from an increasing incidence of
extreme weather events. In result, such areas become less and less habitable.4
The aforementioned phenomenon brings serious problem since coastal
areas are highly inhibited. An rough estimation indicates that more than 3
billion people of the world live in coasta areas with a distance of less than
200km from coastline.5 In addition, people live not only close to the coast but
also very close to sea surface. Consequently, an approximate sea level rise of
1 meter may sink land area inhibited by around 60 million people (Ananthaswamy, 2009: 30-31). Similarly, another analysis also reveals that around 60%
of Indonesian population live in coastal area.6
For small islands countries like those in the Pacific, for example, sea
level rise is a serious threat. It can significantly shift coastline landward so
that the land shrinks. While a larger area may have enough space to anticipate
this coastline shift, it is not the case with small islands. Not only does sea level
rise may decrease the size of land, it can totally submerge them in the case of
extreme sea level rise. Hypothesis on the sinking of Indonesian small islands
seem to find its justification since climate change can indeed cause significant
sea level rise.
The impact of sea level rise to the life of human being has become parts
of many parties’ serious concern. From the one perspective, this might be seen
as a landward impact. Sea level rise also certainly has seaward impact, which
concerns the size of maritime area a coastal state is entitled to pursuant to the
international law of the sea. Sea level rise can change coastline, which means
the change of baselines and eventualy cause the change ot maritime zone of
jurisdiction a coastal State i entitled to. This paper discuss the impact of sea
level rise as the consequence of climate change to the shif ot maritime zone
of jurisdiction. It covers principles of costal States’ entitlement of maritime
areas and principle of maritime division between countries. Following that,
impacts of sea level rise are discussed as the important part of the paper. Uneven impacts of sea level rise is also highlighted followed by response options
to address the issue.
This paper is mainly a theoretical analysis, which apply generally regardliess of geographical context. This paper does not specifically discuss any
particular case but provide adequate focus on Indonesia as an archipelagic
State. Technical and legal terms such as baselines, basepoints, maritime jurisdictions, maritime boundareis are extensively used in this paper, the definition of which are provided subsection 4 of this paper and are illustrated
relevant figures.
4
Schofield, C. and Arsana, I M. A., Imaginary Islands? Options to Preserve Maritime Jurisdictional
Entitlements and Provide Stable Maritime Limits in the Face of Coastal Instability, Ablos Conference, Monaco, 25-27 October 2010.
5
Walker, G. and King, D. 2008. The Hot Topic: How to Tackle Global Warming and Still Keep the
Lights On, London.
6
Tarigan, M. S. 2007. Perubahan Garis Pantai Di Wilayah Pesisir Perairan Cisadane, Provinsi Banten, Makara, Sains, Vol. 11, No. 1, April 2007: 49-55
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Research and discussion on climate change has been intensively carried out by many parties. Even though views from different parties seem to
converge in many aspects, this topic apparently remains a debate among scientists, national/international leaders and policy makers.7 Debates also take
place between those who believe that climate change is a reality and those
who believe that it is merely a myth. Some even believe that climate change is
a lie that is intentionally disseminated for specific purposes.8 Having observed
the trend of these debates, it seems unlikely that those different parties will
reach one sigle agreement on how they view climate change.9
Debates also concern the cause and impacts of climate change.10 However, several available scientific evidences confirm that climate change is a
reality. For example, the change of season pattern (duration of summer, falls,
winter and spring) in some sub-tropical regions can really be felt for the last
couple of years.11 Similarly, the pattern of wet and dry season in tropical regions like Indonesia has also experience anomaly so that it affect farming and
fisheries activities.12 In addition, one of the finding the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) leads to a conclusion that climate change is a
reality which is unequivocally human-induced).13 This IPPC’s finding is one of
the strong reasons of the UNFCCC in Bali at the end of 2007.14
Sea level rise has been widely acknowledged as a reality. CSIRO of Australia, for example, asserts that the rate of sea level rise reaches 1.7 mm per
year within the 20th century with a rate of up to 3.4 mm per year during the
period of 1993 to 2007.15 However, different sources reveal different data regarding the rate of sea level rise and debates remain in place
The principle causes of sea level rise arise from the thermal expansion
of the oceans and the disintegration of land-based ice sheets. The first of these,
the so-called ‘steric effect’, occurs as a consequence of the increasing atmospheric temperatures associated with global warming. As air temperatures
rise so, gradually and incrementally, the oceans also warm. As they warm,

7
The Times Online 2009. EU’s new figurehead believes climate change is a myth, The Times Online
2 January 2009. Diakses dari <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5430362.
ece> tanggal 3 Maret 2011.
8
Leiserowitz, A. A. 2005. American Risk Perceptions: Is Climate Change Dangerous?, Risk Analysis,
Vol. 25, No. 6.
9
See above note 3
10
Daily Mail 2007. Greenhouse effect is a myth, say scientists. Diakses dari <http://www.dailymail.
co.uk/sciencetech/article-440049/Greenhouse-effect-myth-say-scientists.html> tanggal 15 Maret 2011
11
Duzheng, Y. Yundi, J. and Wenjie, D. 2003. The northward shift of climatic belts in China during
the last 50 years and the corresponding seasonal responses, Advances in Atmospheric Sciences, Volume
20, Number 6, pp. 959-967.
12
Presiden RI 2011. Presiden Hadiri Pencanangan Gerakan Nasional Menghadapi Anomali Iklim.
Diakses dari < http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/fokus/2011/01/14/6347.html> tanggal 5 Maret
2011.
13
IPCC 2007. IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). Diakses dari <http://www.ipcc.ch/#> tanggal 12 Maret 2011.
14
Personal communication with Rachmat Witoelar (Head of the Indonesian Delegation in COP15,
Copenhagen) in December 2009 in Sydney.
15
CSIRO 2009. The science of climate change, CSIRO. Diakses dari <http://www.csiro.au/files/
files/poqu.pdf> tanggal 12 March 2011.
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surface waters expand and this in turn translates to a rise in sea level. Considerable uncertainty surrounds the whether and how swiftly land-based ice
sheets such as those of Antarctica and Greenland, are melting. Consequently,
the IPCC did not factor in this potential loss leading to its relatively moderate
predictions in its Fourth Assessment Report of 2007 estimating the range of
sea-level rise at between 0.38 to 0.59 metres above 1990 levels by 2100, with
a mid-range prediction of the order of 40 centimetres.16
IPCC’s conservative approach highlighted above also attract has been
critisised. Meanwhile, some other analysis state that if the melting of ice in
the polar region is considered, it is likely that the rate of sea level rise is predicted higher. For example, there is strong indication that the melting of ice
in Greenland may cause sea level rise of around six to seven meter.17 Even
though this is based on the assumption that the entire iece in Greenland has
melted, it is clear that the rate of sea level rise is potentially higher that that
predicted by IPCC. This seems to te the reason why coastal States are preparing themselves to face muc higher sea level rise that that predicted by IPCC).18
Department of Climate Change of Australia, for example, published their study
“Climate Change Risks to Australia’s Coast: A First Pass National Assessment”
in November 2009. The report ellaborates the worst case scenario of sea level
rise of 1.1 meter in 2100.19 Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, issue on climate change in Indonesia is even more worrying. It is stated that around 2000
islands in Indonesia will disappear in 2030 due to sea level rise. Following
Rachmat Witoelar’s statement about the issue in 2007, Prof. Indroyono Susilo
of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fhishereis reiterated the statement in
February 2008.20
It is worth noting that sea level rise is also influenced by a long-term
cycle and other natural process. In addition, there are differences between
climate variability and climate change, both of which are often misuderstood.
Climate variability is short term in nature (daily, seasonal, annually, etc),
which include fluctuation in relation to the occurence of El Niño (dry) or La
Niña (wet). Meanwhile, climate change is the average trend of climate in a
long-term (decate or more), which has been observed in centuries. It also involves long-term change regarding variability such as requency, how bad the
impacts is, and uration of extreme phenomena.21 In other words, not all of the
variation of climate can be considered as part of climate change.
Apart from sea level rise, it has been evident that land subsidence also
contributes to the submergence of certain coastal areas. It has been con16
See, the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), available on the internet at, <http://www.ipcc.
ch/#> (last accessed 21 November 2009).
17
(Walker and King, 2008: 778-780 in Schofield, C. and Arsana, I M. A., Imaginary Islands? Options
to Preserve Maritime Jurisdictional Entitlements and Provide Stable Maritime Limits in the Face of Coastal
Instability, Ablos Conference, Monaco, 25-27 October 2010. See above note 3 and 4
18
. See above note 3
19
Department of Climate Change 2009. Climate Change Risks to Australia’s Coast: A First Pass
National Assessment available at <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/en/publications/coastline/climatechange-risks-to-australias-coasts.aspx>.
20
Antara 2008 2000. Pulau Akan Tenggelam pada 2030. Diakses dari <http://www.antaranews.
com/view/?i=1204115346&c=WBM&s=> tanggal 10 Maret 2011
21
Climate Kelpie 2010. Climate variability and climate change - what’s the difference? Diakses dari
<http://www.climatekelpie.com.au/understand-climate/climate-change-science/climate-variability-andclimate-change-whats-the-difference> tanggal 10 Maret 2011.
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firmed, for example, that land subsidence is responsible to the submergence
of part of Semarang City, Central Java.22 It reveals that the dynamic position of
sea level relative to the land is not only caused by sea level rise but also land
subsidence. It does not matter whether it is sea level rise of land subsidence,
this has been confirmed to be a reality and certainly causes serious impacts to
most (if not all) of the world’s population.23 In line with that, there are indications that global sea level rise does happen. Sea level rise, whether it is absolute or relative, causes the change of coastlines, especially low water used as
baselines, that may eventually affect maritime zone of jurisdiction that such
coastal States can claim or are entitled to.
III. Maritime Claims and Delimitation

A. Baselines in the context of the law of the Sea
Pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
(hereinafter referred to as Law of the Sea Convention, LOSC) 24 a coastal State
is entitled to zones of maritime jurisdiction measured from its baselines (see
subsection B). In accordance to LOSC, coastal States can opt to designate ‘normal’ baselines25 or straight baselines.26 A state that qualifies as an archipelagic
State according to LOSC27 can designate archipelagic baselines “joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.”28
In additions to those, baselines can also include lines closing mouth of rivers29
and mouth of bays30 and baselines related to ports31 and roadsteads.32 A state
may use a combination of different types of baseline to construct the overall
baseline around its coastline.33
Irrespective of the types, baselines are vital in defining the outer limits
of maritime zones a coastal State is entitled to. Landward of a coastal State’s
baselines lie either its land territory, including the inter-tidal foreshore landward of normal low-water line baselines, or internal waters. Baselines serve
as the starting point from where the outer limits of maritime zones (see subsection 3.2) are measured. In addition, baselines are also important in constructing equidistance lines between coastal States in the delimitation of
maritime boundaries. In this context it is notable that equidistance lines, the
22
Sutanta, H., Rajabifard, A. and Bishop, I. D. 2009. “An Integrated Approach for Disaster Risk
Reduction Using Spatial Planning and SDI Platform”, pp.341-351 in Ostendorf B., Baldock, P., Bruce, D., Burdett, M. and P. Corcoran (eds). Proceedings of the Surveying & Spatial Sciences Institute Biennial International Conference, Adelaide 2009, Surveying & Spatial Sciences Institute.
23
See above note 3
24
United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), opened for signature 10 December
1982, in force 16 November 1994, 1833 UNTS 3.
25
		
LOSC Article 5.
26
		
LOSC Article 7.
27
		
LOSC Article 46.
28
		
LOSC Article 47.
29
		
LOSC Article 9.
30
		
LOSC Article 10.
31
		
LOSC Article 11.
32
		
LOSC Article 12.
33
		
LOSC Article 14.
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construction of which necessarily depend on the use of baselines, have proved
to be by far the most popular method of delimitation.34
Of particular note in the context of sea level rise, the normal baselines of
a coastal State are the “low-water line along the coast as marked on large scale
charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”35 In their designation, normal
baselines do not require coastal States to make active claim or publication. In
addition, if a State does not publish any type of baselines, then it employs normal baselines since they are “a coastal state’s default baselines.”36 This is the
predominant type of baseline worldwide. Article 5 of LOSC does not specify a
particular low water line that should be used, this choice is left to the coastal
state. The particular low water line opted for is, in turn, dependent upon the
choice of the vertical level (technically the ‘vertical datum’) that represents
‘zero’ from which heights and depths are measured. This reference level intersects the coast as the low water line.
The rule of thumb is that the higher the vertical datum is, the closer
landward the location of baselines will be. Similarly, the lower the vertical datum then the further ‘down the beach’ the low water line, and thus the starting
line for the measurement of maritime claims, generally becomes. Unsurprisingly, States have tended to favour the application of low vertical datums in
order to determine their low water lines and thus normal baselines. In practice, many coastal States favour the use of lowest astronomical tide (LAT) for
this purpose. LAT is a particularly low vertical datum, and thus low water
line, consisting of “the lowest level which can be predicted to occur under
average meteorological conditions and under a combination of astronomical
conditions.”37 LAT is based on observations made over a period of 18.6 years,
“identified as the relative rotation of the lunar and solar orbits or regression
of the lunar nodes.”38
Unlike normal baselines that do not require declaration, other types of
baselines such as straight, mouth of river closing lines, and bay closing lines
need to be explicitly declared. The baselines “shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position” or alternatively they can
also be presented in “a list of geographical coordinates of points, specifying
the geodetic datum”.39 Coastal states need to give due publicity to the charts
or list of coordinates need and provide their copy to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.40 This is also applicable to archipelagic baselines an ar34
See, for example, Prescott, J.R.V. and Schofield, C.H. (2005) The Maritime Political Boundaries
of the World (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), at pp.239-241.
35 LOSC Article 5
36
Beckman, R., and Schofield, C. (2009) “Moving Beyond Disputes Over Island Sovereignty: ICJ
Decision Sets Stage for Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Singapore Strait”, Ocean Development and
International Law, Vol. 40:1: 1-35, at p. 5.
37
See International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) (with the International Oceanographic
Commission and the International Association of Geodesy), A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Special Publication No 51, 4th edition, International Hydrographic Bureau, Monaco 2006, ch 2, 18. This publication is often referred to as the ‘TALOS Manual’.
38
Sobey, R. J., (2005). Extreme low and high water levels, Coastal Engineering, Vol. 52, p. 65.
39
LOSC Article 16 (1). Geodetic datum is a reference from which measurements are made. In
surveying and geodesy, a datum is a set of reference points on the Earth’s surface against which position
measurements are made. Without specific geodetic datum, coordinates are meaningless, the actual location
of which cannot be define on earth.
40
LOSC Article 16 (2)
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chipelagic State can designate pursuant to the LOSC.41 With regard to the use
of vertical datum, baselines other than normal baselines are also dependent
upon the choice of vertical datum. Turning points of straight and archipelagic
baselines, for example, need to be anchored to the coast as represented by the
low water line. In short, the position of low water line will eventually affect
the designation of baselines, irrespective of their types.

B. Zones of Maritime Jurisdictions
Measured seaward from its baselines, a coastal State may theoretically
claim the full suite of zones of maritime jurisdiction provided for in accordance with LOSC. These zones include a 12 nautical miles (M) breadth territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 M from baselines (or 12 M from territorial
sea limits), an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) out to 200 M and continental
shelf that may extend up to 350 M or even more (see Figure 1).42 The outer
limits of continental shelf, unlike the limits of other zones which depend only
on distance, depend also on geology and geomorphology of seabed. That is
why the outer limit of continental shelf is not as fixed as other zones’. In addition to the aforementioned zones, a coastal State is also entitled to, when
applicable, internal waters measured landward from baselines.

Figure 1 Maritime jurisdictions of a coastal State according to the LOCS

For each maritime zone, a coastal States exercise either full sovereignty
or only sovereign rights for specific purposes. Coastal States have sovereignty
over internal waters, over archipelagic waters within archipelagic baselines
such as those defined by coastal States) and over the territorial sea. With regard to all of these zones the coastal State’s sovereignty extends through the
seabed and subsoil, water column and airspace above. Within the Exclusive
41
42

LOSC Article 47 (8) (9)
LOSC Article 3, 33, 57 and 76 respectively.
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Economic Zone and continental shelf, by contrast, coastal States have specific sovereign rights to utilise and manage natural resources (fishing, oil and
gas mining, etc). While the Exclusive Economic Zone relates to both seabed
and subsoil and the water column overlying the seabed, the continental shelf
relates solely to the seabed and subsoil.43 The High Seas are part of the sea
which excluding the EEZ, the territorial sea or the internal waters of a coastal
State, or the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.44 Meanwhile, The
Area covers seabed region beyond coastal States’ continental shelf, which is
considered as the common heritage of mankind.45
A further difference between the various maritime zones of jurisdiction
is that fact that some of them, such as the Exclusive Economic Zone, require an
active claim on the part of the coastal State and some do not. In particular, continental shelf rights are inherent and “do not depend on occupation, effective
or notional, or on any express proclamation”.46 This means that a coastal State
may explore and exploit natural resources within its continental shelf without
making an express claim to it. The basis for this distinct treatment rests on
the concept that the coastal State possesses rights to its continental shelf as
the “natural prolongation of its land territory” into and under the sea.47 LOSC
provides that a coastal State’s continental shelf extends beyond the limits of
its territorial sea “to the outer edge of the continental margin” or, to 200 M
from its relevant baselines where the continental margin does not extend to
that distance. The procedure to delineate the outer limits of continental shelf
beyond 200 M is set out in Article 76 of the LOSC (see below).
IV. Setting the Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction

The limits of a coastal State’s maritime jurisdiction can be established
in one of three ways. First, maritime claims can be generated to the full extent
allowed for under international law, in the absence of analogous claims on the
part of neighbouring States. Second, where overlapping claims to maritime
jurisdiction exist, maritime boundaries may be delimited between neighbouring States. Thirdly, with respect to continental shelf limits, the definition of
its outer limits involves a submission process to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the continental shelf as previously mentioned (see also
below).
Provided that a coastal State does not have any neighbours having overlapping claim for a particular zone, such coastal state can define its maritime
limits unilaterally. For example, if the coastal State has no neighbours within
24 M distance from its baselines, it can unilaterally define its territorial sea
limits. With regard to this option, the outer limits of maritime zones are commonly defined using the method of envelope of arc.48 The limits of such claims
43
It is worth noting, however, that rights over seabed and subsoil claimed as part of the EEZ
under Part V of LOSC are exercised in accordance with LOSC Part VI dealing with the continental shelf. See,
LOSC, Article 56(3).
44
LOSC, Article 86.
45
LOSC, Article 136.
46
LOSC, Article 77(3).
47
LOSC, Article 76(1).
48
Carleton, C.M. and Schofield, C.H. (2001) Developments in the Technical Determination of
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are generally dependent on the baselines from which these maritime claims
are measured and thus may move over time as such baselines shift. However,
it is worth noting that the use of this method employs only relevant basepoints
along baselines to generate maritime limits. Depending on the shape and configuration of baselines, not every point along baselines will have effects to location of maritime limits. In other words, while some part of baselines may
be crucial in constructing maritime limits, other part of the baselines may not
contribute as much due to its geographical location along the baselines. However, it is generally true that the changes of baselines can shift maritime limits.
It has been observed that if all coastal States were to make their maximum maritime claims permitted by the LOSC, around 44.5% of the world
ocean could possibly fall under some form of national jurisdiction. This
means that the remaining high seas would encompass approximately 55.5%
of world’s ocean surface.49 Interestingly, it is hard to find that a coastal State
can claim a full suit of maritime zones without having overlapping claims with
its neighbours. To be able to fully claim EEZ, for example, distance of a coastal
State from its neighbours must be more than 2 times 200 M. For the case of
continental shelf, the distance required may be even more.50 However, this
situation does not impact the way the breadth of maritime zones are, theoretically, measured from baseliConsidering the geographical location of coastal
States in the world and the configuration of their coasts, overlapping claims
of maritime zones among coastal States is inevitable (see Figure 2). Consequently, maritime delimitation is required to produce maritime boundaries.
Maritime delimitation between States is therefore another way for coastal
States to define the limits of their maritime zones. While the first option is a
unilateral process, maritime delimitation in the second option is a bilateral or
multilateral process.

Maritime Space: Charts, Datums, Baselines, Maritime Zones and Limits, Maritime Briefing, 3, 3, Durham:
International Boundaries Research Unit, at p.62.
49
Pruett, L. 2004. Area Calculations of the Claims and Potential Claims to Offshore Jurisdictional Zones and High Seas, unpublished data derived from the August 2003 Edition of the Global Maritime
Boundaries Database, General Dynamics, Herndon, VA, USA, in Prescott, V. and Schofield, C. 2005. The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, 2nd edition, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 9, 27
50
Pursuant to Article 76 of LOSC, continental shelf can extend up to a distance of 350 M or even
more.
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Figure 2 Maritime zones based on LOSC

The process of maritime boundary delimitation between two or more
coastal states is governed by the principles and rules of public international law.51 International law provides the “rules of the game” explaining how
maritime boundary delimitations should be established. However, maritime
boundary delimitation is usually resolved either through negotiation among
affected parties or by submission of the case to the third party.52 This third
party can be arbitrators, mediators, courts or tribunal such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ)53 and the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS).54
Figure 2 shows that overlapping claim takes place in EEZ and continental shelf because distance between State A and B is less then 400 M but is
more than 24 M. should the distance between those two neighbouring States
is less than 24 M then their territorial sea will overlap one another. This is
to illustrate that maritime boundary delimitation can be required for territorial sea, EEZ, or continental shelf, depending on the distance between States
in question. In this regard, rules governing maritime boundary delimitation
51
Prescott, JRV. and Schofield, C., (2005). The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Second
Edition, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 218
52
Ibid
53
See: International Court of Justice at <http://www.icj-cij.org>
54
See: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea at <http://www.itlos.org>
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for those different zones are also different. For territorial sea for example, it
is explicitly stated by the LOSC that “neither of the two opposite or adjacent
states is entitled to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line” unless
either state involved agrees otherwise, or due to the existence of “historic title or other special circumstances”.55 It is understood from this provision the
method to delimit territorial sea is explicitly mentioned in the LOSC, which
is median line or equidistance line.56 However, the LOSC does not specifically
mention methods in delimitating EEZ and continental shelf boundaries in
case overlapping claims between two or more state are identified. Provisions
in the LOSC only mention that EEZ boundaries between States with opposite
or adjacent coast should be established to “achieve an equitable solution.”57
“Equitable solution” is also the term used for the delimitation of continental
shelf in the case of overlapping claims between States.58 Notwithstanding the
positive intention of LOSC in using the term “equitable solution” in delimiting
EEZ and continental shelf boundaries, the Convention does not specifically
mention the method to be used in establishing boundary lines.
One important aspect about maritime boundaries settled bilaterally/
multilaterally is that they stay where they are. Maritime boundaries do not
change unless parties in question agree to do so. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that boundary treaties are excluded from
the rule that a party to a treaty may invoke “a fundamental change in circumstances” as a ground for terminating a treaty.59 In addition, the 1978 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties also provides that a
change of states does not affect a boundary established by a treaty.60 In other
words, agreed maritime boundaries are fixed in term of location even if baselines from which they are constructed have shifted.
The third option to define the outer limits of maritime jurisdiction is
through a submission to a third party as in the case of continental shelf beyond 200 M from baselines. In order to confirm its sovereign rights over areas
of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its baseline, LOSC provides that a coastal State should make a submission regarding its proposed
outer continental shelf limits, mainly on the basis of geological and geomorphologic evidence, and submit this to the United Nations Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS or the Commission).61 The continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from baseline is commonly termed the ‘outer’
or ‘extended’ continental shelf or ECS (see Figure 1), the outer limit of which
involve complicated procedures and enormous of resources. The procedure
for the delineation of the outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 M was
also detailed by the Commission in its Scientific and Technical Guidelines
LOSC, Article 15
The Manual on the Technical Aspects of the LOSC published by International Hydrographic
Bureau (2006: 6-3) states that the term “median line” is similar to “equidistance line”, “a line every point of
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the territorial sea baselines of two States.”
57
LOSC, Article 74
58
LOSC, Article 83
59
Vienna Convention 1969, Article 62 (2)(a)
60
Vienna Convention 1978, Article 11 (a)
61
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf was established pursuant to LOSC,
Annex II. It consists of 21 members of experts in Geology, Geophysics, Hydrography, and Geodesy, who
are elected from state parties to the LOCS every five years. More information of the Commission can be
obtained from its official website: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm.
55
56
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(CLCS/11) which were adopted on May 13, 1999.62 Once the Commission has
delivered its recommendations to the coastal State, that State may declare
the outer limits of its outer continental shelf which are “final and binding”
when defined “on the basis of” the Commission’s recommendations.63 In other
words, even though the outer limit of continental shelf is not definitive in term
of distance from baselines, unlike the outer limits other zones, the limit is
fixed in term or location, once it has been properly established.
From the three options to set the limits of maritime jurisdictions elaborated above, the first generates unfixed maritime limits while the last two established fixed one. Shifting maritime limits in the first option is due to shifting baselines, especially the normal one. The changing of coastal environment
will eventually change coastlines which in turn can change the configuration
of normal baselines. This consequently will change the outer limits of maritime limits. Meanwhile, agreed maritime boundaries and outer limits of continental shelf beyond 200 M are fixed.
V. Potential Impacts of Climate Change

A. Ambulatory baselines and shifting maritime limits
It has long been recognised that parts of the coast are dynamic and
can change location and configuration in relatively short periods of time or
“ambulate”.64 Indeed, coastlines often change in a cyclical manner over time
(alternately shifting seawards through deposition or accretion of material and
then landwards as a consequence of erosion).65 The location of normal baselines will therefore tend to move over time. The traditionally generally accepted implication of this phenomenon is that as normal baselines change, so
too will the maritime jurisdictional limits measured from them. Thus, where
the baseline advances (for example, by the deposition of material along the
coast) the outer limits of the maritime claims measured from that baseline
will likewise expand seawards. Conversely, where the normal baseline recedes (through coastal erosion), the coastal state may ‘lose’ maritime areas as
their maritime limits are likewise pulled back.
Since normal baselines are represented by low-water line, sea level is
an important issue in the definition of normal baselines. That said, whilst normal, low water line, baselines would seem to be most obviously susceptible
to change as a consequence of sea level rise, other types of straight line type
baseline are also potentially threatened by sea level rise as such baselines
62
The Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission contains technical and scientific
procedure to define the outer limits of continental shelf. It is published in document CLCS/11 and is available online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.htm#Guidelines>. For
other analysis concerning outer continental shelf delineation, see for example: Schofield, C. Arsana, I M. A.
and van de Poll, R. (2010), ‘The Outer Continental Shelf in the Asia-Pacific Region: Progress and Prospects’
in Vidas, D (ed) Law, Technology and Science for Oceans in Globalization, Martinus Nijhoff.
63
LOSC, Article 76 (8).
64
Reed, M. Shore and sea boundaries: the development of international maritime boundary
principles through United States practice, (Washington D.C.: US Department of Commerce, 2000), at 185;
Prescott and Schofield, Maritime Political boundaries of the World, supra note 22, at 100-101.
65
See, for example, Hirst, W. and Robertson, D., “Geographic Information Systems, Charts and
UNCLOS – Can They Live Together?”, Maritime Studies, 136 (May-June 2004), at 1-6.
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need to be anchored to the coast as represented by the low water line.
Rising sea levels will generally tend to lead to the retreat inland of the
low water line, and thus the normal baseline. This can result in significant
‘knock on’ impacts on the limits of maritime jurisdictional claims if the basepoints, on which the limits of such claims depend, similarly retreat inland.
This threat to the extent of national maritime jurisdictional claims is especially significant for coastal states such as Bangladesh which have large stretches
of low lying coasts. The maritime claims of States in possession (or, indeed,
entirely composed) of low elevation islands, are also under threat from this
phenomenon. Small, remote and low lying islands can give rise to significant
maritime jurisdictional entitlements. However, sea level rise could change
the legal status of such insular features (see Figure 3). For example, an island
presently always above water surface even during high tide may, as a consequence of sea level rise, eventually disappear during high tide. This could lead
to it being reclassified from an island from which claims to the full range of
maritime zones may be made, to one of the categories of insular formation
from which only restricted maritime claims can be made such as a ‘rock’ or a
low tide elevation (features that are exposed at low tide but are submerged at
high tide) or even a fully submerged feature which cannot be used to generate
maritime claims.66

Figure 3 Insular features and sea tides

B. Uneven impacts
While, as noted above, sea level rise would logically and inevitably
seems to result in the retreat of normal baselines inland, it is important to
recognise coastal complexity and variability. Accordingly, sea level rise is likely to result in uneven consequences in terms of impacts on maritime jurisdictional claims.
For example, the gradient of the coast is an important factor. Where the

66
Schofield, C.H. ‘Shifting Limits?: Sea Level Rise and Options to Secure Maritime Jurisdictional
Claims’(2009) 4 Carbon and Climate Law Review, pp.405-16, at pp.409-410.
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coastline is relatively steep in gradient, the impact of sea level rise will be
limited in terms of shifting the location of baselines (and thus the maritime
jurisdictional limits derived from them) horizontally. Conversely, where the
coastline is gently shelving, even relatively slight changes in sea level vertically can result in significant shifts in the location of the low water line horizontally and this, in turn, can have significant impacts on the spatial extent of
national maritime claims.
Figure 4 illustrates two different sea levels and two distinct coastline
gradients. The impact of a rise in sea level from Level 1 to Level 2 is significantly more pronounced in terms of the horizontal change or recession inland in the location of the normal baseline for the shallower gradient coastline
shown. In short, the steeper the coastal area is, the less the impact will be. A
very shallow foreshore gradient, for example 5% or less (around 3° measured
from horizontal line), will be affected by around 20 meters of horizontal distance on the location of the normal baseline as a result of one meter difference
in vertical datum. For the same difference in vertical datum, a steep foreshore
gradient, for example 173% or more (around 60° measured from horizontal
line), can be affected only by 0.5 meters of horizontal distance. In this context
it is worth noting that errors in the definition of the vertical datum can also
affect the location of baselines, which depends on the gradient of foreshore.67

Figure 4 The impact of different sea levels on different gradients of coast

It is also the case that not all of a coastal State’s baselines contribute
towards the construction of the outer limits of its maritime claims. Maritime
limits are commonly constructed through the ‘envelope of arcs’ method.68
Consequently, only certain basepoints along the normal baseline, essentially
the outermost points along the baseline such as headlands and offshore islands, will be relevant to the limits of the maritime zones with the length of
the arcs from the contributing basepoints being determined by the breadth of
67
Leahy, F.J., Murphy, B. A., Collier, P. A., and Mitchell, D. J., (2001). Uncertainty Issues in the
Geodetic Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, Proceeding of the 2001 ABLOS Conference. Available at
<http:// www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS01Folder/LEAHY.PDF> (last accessed 29 August 2010).
68
Carleton, C.M. and Schofield, C.H. (2001) Developments in the Technical Determination of
Maritime Space: Charts, Datums, Baselines, Maritime Zones and Limits, Maritime Briefing, 3, 3, Durham:
International Boundaries Research Unit, at p.62.
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the maritime zone for which the outer limit is being constructed. In contrast,
those parts of the baseline that are, for example, located on the inner portion
of a bay, are unlikely to contribute to the outer limit of maritime zones. Indeed,
the majority of the baseline is irrelevant to the construction of the outer limits
to maritime jurisdictional zones.

Figure 5 Envelope of arc and relevant basepoints

Figure 5 illustrates that, only points a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, and i contribute to
the construction of the envelope of arc which define the maritime limits. Any
point along the baseline between e and f, for example, contribute nothing to
the definition of maritime limits. Accordingly, should for some reason the e-f
segment shifts landward, maritime limits will not be affected.

C. Islands and coast under threat
While large populations occupying low-lying coastal areas on continental coasts are arguably most at risk from sea level rise, it is noticeable that the
debate on the issue tends to be framed, even dominated, by the concerns of
and about a number of small island States. This focus, especially in the media
narrative, perhaps stems from a perception that, in contrast to small low-lying
island States, continental States have other, higher, land for displaced populations to retreat to. Additionally, the small island States are well placed to
readily (and arguably rightly) elicit sympathy for their apparent predicament,
especially as the small island states can argue convincingly that they have
done perhaps the least to cause global climate change through the emission
Year 3 Vol. 2, May - August 2013
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of greenhouse gases.
Concerns over sea level rise by and on behalf of these States have been
in large part prompted by recognition that certain States not only possess limited land territory but, more particularly, little territory elevated above present sea levels. For example, the highest point on the territory of the Maldives
his only 2.4 metres above sea level. Similarly, it has been suggested that sea
level rise is already a real emergency for Tuvalu, 69 which has accordingly been
described as the “front line of climate change.”70 Analogous concerns exist for
other small, relatively low lying, island States.
While it has been suggested that sea level rise could ultimately lead
to certain low-lying island States sinking beneath the waves and thus losing
their status as States,71 this does not appear to be on the horizon at least in the
near term. For example, even if sea levels were to rise by one metre, no State
would be completely inundated. That said, even relatively slight sea level rises
may have major impacts on island habitability. These concerns have led to the
formation of bodies such as the Alliance of Small Islands States (AoSIS) has
been established to address issues of their vulnerability to climate change.72
While there has been mounting evidence that impacts of sea level rise
is generally negative, some may see it as an accidental benefit with regard in
resolving sovereignty disputes. For instance, the alleged disappearance of a
disputed island called South Talpatty (by Bangladesh) or New Moore (by India) was suggested as an unlooked for ‘benefit’ of climate change. However, in
fact this did not prove to be the case as, not only were reports of the island’s
demise somewhat premature as it was reported that the island still appears
during “very, very low tide conditions”,73 but (at least) one of the parties to the
dispute, Bangladesh, promptly reasserted its sovereignty claim to the feature.
It remains to be seen whether or not sea level rise will yet have a positive
impact on long-standing, contentious island sovereignty disputes such as that
over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea or will merely add a further
layer of confusion and uncertainty to already uncertain scenario.74
Notwithstanding mounting evidence suggesting threats to islands and
coasts due to climate change, counterarguments do exist. For example, there
is evidence to suggest that coral atolls have proven to be remarkably robust
features over long time periods, including periods when sea levels were considerably higher than they presently are. This suggests that some insular fea69
A point noted by HE Mr. Enele Sosene Sopoaga, former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Mission of Tuvalu to the United Nations at the 2007 United Nations Framework Conference
on Climate Change. See, Leake, J. (2007). Global warming and the world’s low-lying countries, The Sunday
Times. Available at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article3054040.ece> (last accessed 30 August 2010).
70
Patel, S. S. (2006) A Sinking Feeling, Nature Vol. 44, 6 April 2006, p. 734.
71
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides that a State
should possess a “defined territory” and a “permanent population”, as well as a government and the capacity to enter into international relations with other States. The first two of these four requirements could be
directly impacted by sea level rise. See, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, opened
for signature 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934), Article 1.
72
See, Alliance of Small Islands States at <http://www.sidsnet.org/> (last accessed 1 September
2010).
73
Wade, M. (2009) Rising sea level settles border dispute, The Sydney Morning Herald. Available at <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/rising-sea-level-settles-border-dispute20100324-qwum.html> (last access on 28 August 2010).
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Dupont, A. (2008) The Strategic Implications of Climate Change, Survival, Volume 50: 3, p.36.
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tures may be able to naturally adapt to climate change and sea level rise. It
could also been argued that overpopulation of small islands, coupled with inappropriate land uses are important factors impacting on the integrity of, for
instance, coral island ecosystems and thus the continued habitability of such
features.
VI. Responding to the impacts of Climate Change

Either for sea level rise or land subsidence, it is evident that the current normal baselines are ambulatory in character, which in turn can shift
maritime limits measured from them. On the other hands, there is a need to
have fixed maritime limits for better ocean space management. Two options
are possible to overcome this issue: stabilising the baselines and/or fixing the
outer maritime limits.

A. Fixing the baselines
To fix the baselines, physical and legal approach can be attempted. As
for physical approach, baselines are physically represented by coastlines so
that stabilising baselines means preserving coastlines. Building sea defences,
such as sea wall, groynes, and wave reduction structures, may be seen as alternatives to protect coastlines from being degraded by mainly natural occurrence in coastal area, such as erosion and abrasion. Similarly, reclamation
can also be an option to build up vulnerable coastlines. Maldives has started
projects to build up some big islands through reclamation so they have more
safe refuges for its population.75
In the small islands or insulars context, physical intervention can also
be an alternative. An LTE, for example, can be used as a basepoint connecting straight baselines if “lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on” the LTE.76 This indicates that physical intervention to LTE does influence its legal status to serve as a basepoint.
The building of lighthouses and protecting them also means physically protecting the LTE which in turn protects/stabilises baselines. For other insulars
features, physical intervention can also mean building structure such as sea
defences to protect them from wave due to, for example, its critical role as a
basepoint. An example for this is what Japan has done in protecting the Okinotorisima by building a 360-degree ring of sea wall around the small insular
feature.77
The drawback of the physical approach described above is that it is
certainly costly and may be environmentally unfriendly. The building of sea
defences such as sea walls, wave reduction structures, etc has been proven
expensive. Sea wall built by Japan for Okinotorisima costs no less than USD
200 millions in the 1980s.78 This is certainly not a preferable option for less
75
Morris, C. (2009). Maldives rises to climate challenge, BBC News online, 17 March 2009. Available at < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7946072.stm> (last access on 30 August 2010)
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LOSC Article 7 (4).
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Prescott, JRV. and Schofield, C., (2005). The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Second
Edition, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, pp. 84-85.
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A 1991 estimate put the estimated cost of the project at £135 million. See, Brown, J., et al.
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developed States like Maldives, Tuvalu and other Small Islands Developing
States (SIDS), which in fact, are the ones that suffer the sea level rise impact
the most. With regard to the environmental consideration, physical intervention may disturb natural equilibrium and may cause serious “unintended
consequences” in the long run.79 Ecologically, the building of coastal defence
structures can also affect on a local and regional scale concerning the existence of species, which consequently may change the native assemblages of
the surrounding areas.80
Another issue regarding physical intervention such as reclamation
is the legality of the new coastline resulting from reclamation to be used as
baselines. If a coastal State can prove that the reclamation is part of harbour
works that “form an integral part of the harbour system” then the reclamation
“are regarded as forming part of the coast”81 which can be used as baselines.
LOSC also asserts that artificial islands should not be regarded as permanent
harbour works. The next question is “when does an island that was naturally
formed, become artificial?” LOSC does not specifically define what constitutes
artificial islands. Furthermore, there has been no clear guideline whether or
not natural status can be reclaimed.
Having observed the above, it can be concluded that physical intervention approach to stabilise baselines is generally costly and tend to be environmentally and ecologically unfriendly. In addition, interventions such as
reclamation may spark legal questions concerning the validity of reclaimed
coastlines to be used as baselThe other effort in fixing baselines is the legal
approach, which has also been introduced to retain maritime claims.82 Two
major alternatives are fixing the normal baselines or fixing the maritime limits. The LOSC states that normal baselines of a coastal State are the low-water
line depicted on a nautical chart recognised by the coastal State. The key information in this article is that a recognised nautical chart is the legal document on which normal baselines of a coastal State are declared. On the other
hand, there is no clause in the article detailing technical specification of the
nautical chart. The LOSC does not either specifically mention, for example, the
age of chart in question, or whether or not the chart needs to be registered to
or recognised by an international body.
The above observation leads to a conclusion that it is up to the coastal
State to use any chart in defining its normal baselines as long the chart is officially recognised by the coastal State. In order for a coastal State to have fixed
baselines, it needs to have a fixed recognised chart showing the baselines.
Consequently, the State does not need to revise and update the chart. In this
case, the chart produced for the purpose of showing baselines must be different from that used for navigational purposes. For the latter, a nautical chart
has to be regularly revised through surveys to show the most updated coastal
environment and important objects, especially those hazardous to navigation.
(1991), Case Studies in Oceanography and Marine Affairs, Pergamon Press, Oxford, pp. 84-85.
79
Kenchington, R., (2009). Maintaining Coastal and Lagoonal Ecosystem and Productivity. In:
Hiroshi Terashima (ed.), Proceedings of the International Symposium of Islands and Oceans, Ocean Policy
Research Foundation, Tokyo, pp. 3-5
80
Airoldi, L., et al. (2005). An ecological perspective on the deployment and design of low-crested and other hard coastal defence structures, Coastal Engineering Volume 52, pp. 1073– 1087
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LOSC, Article 11.
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See, in particular, Soons, A., (1990). The Effects of Sea Level Rise on Maritime Limits and
Boundaries, Netherlands International Law Review, p. 207.
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This means that such coastal State needs to have different charts for navigational purposes and for baselines definition.
The potential issue with the use of specific and fixed charts showing
baselines is that other States may not necessarily recognise the chart. This
can be problematic if the two States need to delimit maritime boundaries between them. If one State fails to recognise other State’s chart depicting normal
baselines, the progress of the delimitation may be hampered. However, it is
not unique that two States would agree on the use of particular chart for maritime delimitation even though the chart is reasonably ‘old’ and therefore does
not depict the current coastline/baselines. A good example of this practice is
the delimitation of maritime boundary between Indonesia and Singapore in
the Singapore Strait, signed on 10 March 2009.83 Indonesia insisted that Singapore uses its ‘old’ normal baselines as depicted in the ‘original map’ of 1969
in the delimitation and Singapore for its side agreed to do so. 84 To anticipate
problems caused by disagreement on the use of fixed baselines depicted by
a particular chart, coastal States can voluntarily declare their fixed normal
baselines in the same manner as States usually declare straight or archipelagic baselines. By doing so, protest and disagreement from other States, usually
neighbours, can be anticipated well in advance, before the baselines are used
for maritime claims and delimitation.
The instability issue of normal baselines may also be partially overcome
by the use of straight baselines. However, it is worth noting that straight baselines are not originally aimed at fixing baselines in response to global changes
such as sea level rise. The use of straight baselines is in the context of deltas
and unstable coasts.85 This can consequently raise questions on the validity of
straight baselines to be designated in response to the issue of sea level rise. In
addition, while the most part of straight baselines is imaginary lines, they still
require turning points, which should be points somewhere at the interface
of land and water during low tide. Those turning points should not be imaginary and straight baselines cannot ‘float’ in the sea, unattached to any point
on land. Accordingly, straight baselines still require the use of basepoints, the
location of which depends on the choice low-water line, which is unstable in
character. This implies that the use of straight baselines may fix baselines in
particular location/situation but it does not fully resolve the instability issues.
Other issues with straight baselines is that States tend to interpret Article 7
of the LOSC liberally in designating straight baselines since there are some
uncertainties/ambiguities in the article causing it to be multi-interpreted. Accordingly, the straight baselines may be considered excessive by other States
and, therefore, might be rejected.
83
MFA Indonesia, 2009, Press Release: The Signing of The Treaty Between The Republic of Indonesia and The Republic of Singapore Relating to The Delimitation of The Territorial Seas In The Western
Part of The Strait of Singapore, Jakarta, 10 March. Available at <http://www.deplu.go.id/_layouts/mobile/
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on 1 September 2010).
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B. Fixing the limits
Instead of stabilising normal baselines, fixing maritime limits may be
seen as another alternative in dealing with changing environment due to climate change. This idea suggests that once maritime limits are set, they are
permanent in term of location. Accordingly, it does not matter whether or not
coastlines or baselines shift due to sea level rise, maritime limits stay where
they are. Should this be adopted, States will not be disadvantaged if there is
significant sea level rise that shifts baselines closer landward. However, States
may not see this as a good option if for some reasons their baselines shift
further seaward. This is possible if lands are growing, so that coastlines/baselines move further seaward. Ironically, this is scientifically proven for some
Pacific States, which have long been believed to be sinking instead of growing.
A thorough analysis using aerial photos and high-resolution satellite images
for a period of 60 years to study changes in the land surface of 27 Pacific Islands was conducted by Paul Kench at the University of Auckland, New Zealand and Arthur Webb at the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission in
Fiji.86 It has been identified by the scientists that the growing islands seem to
be “largely due to coral debris, land reclamation and sediment.” In this particular case, coastlines/baselines shift further seaward but maritime limits
will stay where there are, which might not be preferable to States in the Pacific. However, considering that sea level rise is accelerating, it seems that in
the future the possibility for island States in the Pacific sinking is bigger than
that of growing. This might make the option of fixing maritime limits can gain
support from climate change-vulnerable island States in the Pacific.
Fixed limits of maritime zones are in fact not a new idea. The outer limits of the continental shelf, when defined based on the recommendation provided by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), are
final and binding.87 This suggests that any changes of baselines or geology and
geomorphology of seabed will not cause any effect on the already-established
outer limits of the continental shelf. However, the situation might be problematic, since it is possible that land territory for some reason no longer exists but
the entitlement to seabed prevails.88 Another issue with these fixed maritime
limits is that while it might be effective as a matter of domestic law it can be
problematic in the international context. The limits, however, are unilateral
claims and other States are not bound by such unilateral claims.
With regard to maritime boundary delimitation, there is no issue for
agreed maritime boundaries since they do not change unless parties in question agree to do so. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states
that boundary treaties are excluded from the rule that a party to a treaty may
invoke “a fundamental change in circumstances” as a ground for terminating
a treaty.89 In addition, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States
in Respect of Treaties also provides that a change of States does not affect a
boundary established by a treaty.90 While the change on baselines will not af86
ABC News, Pacific islands growing, not sinking. Available at <http://www.abc.net.au/news/
stories/2010/06/03/2916873.htm> (last access on 28 August 2010).
87
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fect the already agreed maritime boundaries, it can certainly affect the maritime boundaries being delimited. When baselines are given significant weight
in maritime delimitation, location of maritime boundary lines varies in respect to the location of baselines of parties in question. In conclusion, instable
baselines do not affect agreed maritime boundaries but can influence the process of maritime delimitation for new maritime boundaries.
VII. Summary/Conclusions

One of the impacts of global warming is evident by, among other things,
the increase of sea surface. In an extreme situation sea level rise may sink
land fully or partially. This consequently causes the chance in coastline which
in turns will change baselines. The change of baselines means the change of
reference, from which the outer limits maritime zones are measured. For the
baselines change, the outer limits of maritime zone of jurisdiction measured
from them will eventually change. This confirms that climate change affect
sovereignty and sovereign rights. In other words, climate change may cause
the sinking of sovereignty and sovereign rights. Previous sections in this paper discuss the idea of mitigating the impacts of climate change to maritime
jurisdiction and how to deal with it.
Fixing baselines is one of the proposed solutions by locating baselines in
an imaginary location indicated by coordinates. The idea of imaginary islands
in relation to baselines definition is by no means new. The normal baselines
have always been represented by low-water lines which are almost always
submerged. Accordingly, the effort to fix baselines by locating them in ‘imaginary’ location, which in turn fixes maritime limits in response to sea level rise,
is not a new idea either. The idea proposed in this paper is certainly not the
first one, as some similar thoughts have previously been published in regard
to climate change and its impact to the law of the sea in general. However, this
paper has highlighted some new developments which indicate the urgency of
realising the aforementioned idea. Sea level rise or land subsidence are not
only a reality, they are also accelerating.
While physical intervention to fix coastlines/baselines and maritime
limits seems to be an alternative that works for particular circumstances,
legal fixing is apparently more feasible. This can start from State practices
where coastal States voluntarily declare or even deposit its normal baselines
or maritime limits, analogues to the deposition of straight91 or archipelagic92
baselines. Once declared on an official chart, normal baselines can stay at the
same location until the particular chart is revised. In addition, normal baselines are the ones identified “on large-scale charts officially recognized by the
coastal State”93 and are not necessarily representative of the actual location
of coastline. This supports the idea of fixing normal baselines by preserving
charts assigned particularly for the purpose of depicting baselines.
Another more radical approach to have baselines fixed is to amend the
LOSC. However, this approach seems to be rather unrealistic. Even though the
91
92
93

LOSC, Article 16 (2).
LOSC, Article 47 (9).
LOCS, Article 5.
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LOSC contains amendment procedures, it is unlikely that the procedure would
be activated. UNCLOS IV does not seem to be a process that States Parties are
keen to do in the near future. However, it has been evident that a supplementary agreement is not an impossible solution, such as Fish Stock Agreement of
1995.94 This previously-accepted solution can be used as a model in approaching the idea of fixing baselines and/or maritime limits.
Fixing baselines and/or maritime limits is basically preserving the existing rights of coastal States. For an archipelagic State like Indonesia, for example, the idea of fixing baselines and or maritime limits is preferable for its
small islands, where basepoints and baselines are anchored, are physically
prone to climate change. This idea is not to claim or secure maritime jurisdiction excessively but, instead, to maintain what a coastal State is already
entitled to.
Disclaimer:
Part of this paper has been previously published in peer-reviewed publication or conferences. This current publication is modified and updated from the
previously published works.
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